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Abstract
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel
game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We
characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash
equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions
of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price
of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the
system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium
solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary
stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies
under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brown-von
Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.1 2
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest in understanding the behavior of multi-
ple access channels under constraints. Considerable amount of work has been
carried out on the problem of how users can obtain an acceptable throughput
by choosing rates independently. Motivated by the interest in studying a large
population of users playing the game over time, evolutionary game theory was
found to be an appropriate framework for communication networks. It has been
applied to problems such as power control in wireless networks and mobile inter-
ference control [1]. In [5], an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) multiple
access channel problem was modeled as a noncooperative game with pairwise
interactions, in which users were modeled as rational entities whose only inter-
est was to maximize their own communication rates. The authors obtained the
Nash equilibria of the two-user game and introduced a two-player evolutionary
game model with pairwise interactions based on replicator dynamics. However,
the case when interactions are not pairwise arises frequently in communication
networks, such the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) or the Orthogonal
Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) in Worldwide Interoperability
for Microwave Access (WiMAX) environment [1].
In this work, we extend the study of [5] to wireless communication systems
with an arbitrary number of users corresponding to each receiver. We formulate
a static non-cooperative game with m users subject to rate capacity constraints
and extend the constrained game to a dynamic evolutionary game with a large
number of users whose strategies evolve over time. Different from evolutionary
games with discrete and finite number of actions, our model is based on a class
of continuous games, known as continuous-trait games. Evolutionary games
with continuum action spaces can be seen in a wide variety of applications
in evolutionary ecology, such as evolution of phenology, germination, nutrient
foraging in plants, and predator-prey foraging [10, 20].
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. We show
that the static continuous kernel rate allocation game with coupled rate con-
straints has a convex set of pure Nash equilibria, coinciding with the maximal
face of the polyhedral capacity region. All the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal
and are also strong equilibria, resilient to simultaneous deviation by coalition of
any size. We show that the pure Nash equilibria in the rate allocation problem
are 100% efficient in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA) and constrained Strong
Price of Anarchy (CSPoA). We study the stability of strong equilibria, nor-
malized equilibria, and evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) using evolutionary
game dynamics such as Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, generalized Smith
dynamics, and replicator dynamics.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present in the next section the
evolutionary game model of rate allocation in additive white Gaussian multiple
access wireless networks, and analyze its equilibria and Pareto optimality. In
Section 3, we present strong equilibria and price of anarchy of the game. In
Section 4, we discuss how to select one specific equilibrium such as normalized
equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. Section 5 studies the stability of
equilibria and evolution of strategies using game dynamics. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 The Game Model
We consider a communication system consisting of several receivers and several
senders (See Figure 1). At each time, there are many local interactions (typi-
cally, at each receiver there is a local interaction) at the same time. Each local
interaction will correspond to a non-cooperative one-shot game with common
constraints. The opponents do not necessarily stay the same from a given time
slot to another time slot. Users revise their rates in view of their payoffs and the
coupled constraints (for example by using an evolutionary process, a learning
process or a trial-and-error updating process). The game evolves in time. Users
are interested in maximizing a fitness function based on their own communi-
cation rates at each time, and they are aware of the fact that the other users
have the same goal. The coupled power and rate constraints are also common
knowledge. Users have to choose independently their own coding rates at the
beginning of the communication, where the rates selected by a user may be
either deterministic, or chosen from some distribution. If the rate profile ar-
rived at as a result of these independent decisions lies in the capacity region,
users will communicate at that operating point. Otherwise, either the receiver
is unable to decode any signal and the observed rates are zero, or only one of
the signals can be decoded. The latter case occurs when all the other users are
transmitting at or below a safe rate. With these assumptions, we can define a
constrained non-cooperative game. The set of allowed strategies for user j is
the set of all probability distributions over [0,+∞[, and the payoff is a function
of the rates. In addition, the rational action (rates) sets are restricted to lie in
the capacity regions (the payoff is zero if the constraint is violated). In order
to study the interactions between the selfish or partially cooperative users and
their stationary rates in the long run, we propose to model the rate allocation
in Gaussian multiple access channels as an evolutionary game with a continuous
action space and coupled constraints. The development of evolutionary game
theory is a major contribution of biology to competitive decision making and
the evolution of cooperation. The key concepts of evolutionary game theory
are (i) Evolutionary Stable Strategies [12], which is a refinement of equilibria,
and (ii) Evolutionary Game Dynamics such as replicator dynamics [16], which
describes the evolution of strategies or frequencies of use of strategies in time,
[20, 7].
Figure 1: A population: distributed receivers and senders, represented by blue
rectangles and red circles respectively.
The single population evolutionary rate allocation game is described as fol-
lows: there is one population of senders (users) and several receivers. The
number of senders is large. At each time, there are many one-shot games called
local interactions. Each sender of the population chooses from the same set of
strategies A which is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of R. Without
loss of generality, we can suppose that user j chooses its rate in the interval
A = [0, C{j}], where C{j} is the rate upper bound for user j (to be made precise
shortly), as outside of the capacity region the payoff (as to be defined later) will
be zero. Let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions over the pure strategy
set A. The set ∆(A) can be interpreted as the set of mixed strategies. It is also
interpreted as the set of distributions of strategies among the population. Let
λt ∈ ∆(A), and E be a λt− measurable subset of Rm; then λt(E) represents
the fraction of users choosing a strategy out of E, at time t. A distribution
λt ∈ ∆(A) is sometimes called the “state” of the population. We denote by
B(A) the Borel σ−algebra on A and by d(λ, λ′) the distance between two states
measured with the respect to the weak topology. Each user’s payoff depends on
opponents’ behavior through the distribution of opponents’ choices and of their
strategies. The payoff of a user j in a local interaction with (m− 1) other users
is given as a function uj : Rm −→ R. The rate profile α ∈ Rm must belong to
a common capacity region C ⊂ Rm defined by 2m − 1 linear inequalities. The
expected payoff of a sender transmitting with the rate a when the state of the
population is µ ∈ ∆(A) is given by F (a, µ). The expected payoff is
F (λ, µ) :=
∫
α∈C
u(α) λ(dαj)
∏
i6=j
µ(dαi).
The population state is subjected to the “mixed extension” of capacity con-
straintsM(C). This will be discussed in Section 5 and will be made more precise
later.
2.1 Local Interactions
A local interaction refers to the problem setting of one receiver and its uplink
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) multiple access channel with several
senders (say m ≥ 2) with coupled constraints (or actions). The signal at the
receiver is given by Y = ξ +
∑m
j=1Xj where Xj is a transmitted signal of
user j and ξ is zero mean Gaussian noise with variance σ20 . Each user has an
individual power constraint E(X2j ) ≤ P. The optimal power allocation scheme
is to transmit at the maximum power available, i.e. P , for each user. Hence,
we consider the case in which maximum power is attained. The decisions of the
users then consist of choosing their communication rates, and the receiver’s role
is to decode, if possible. The capacity region is a set of all vectors α ∈ Rm+ such
that users j = 1, 2, . . . ,m can reliably communicate at rate αj , j = 1, . . . ,m.
The capacity region C for this channel is the set
C =
α ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈J
αj ≤ log
(
1 + |J | P
σ20
)
,
∀ ∅ $ J ⊆ Ω} (1)
where Ω := {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We refer the reader to [21] for more details on the
capacity region. Notice that there is a tradeoff between high and low rates: if
user j wants to communicate at a higher rate, one of the other users k may need
to lower its rate, otherwise the capacity constraint is violated.
Example 2.2. (Example of capacity region with three users) In this example,
we illustrate the capacity region with three users. Let α1, α2, α3 be the rates of
the users. Based on (1), we obtain

α1 ≥ 0, α2 ≥ 0, α3 ≥ 0
α1 ≤ log(1 + P
σ20
)
α2 ≤ log(1 + P
σ20
)
α3 ≤ log(1 + P
σ20
)
α1 + α2 ≤ log(1 + 2 P
σ20
)
α1 + α3 ≤ log(1 + 2 P
σ20
)
α2 + α3 ≤ log(1 + 2 P
σ20
)
α1 + α2 + α3 ≤ log(1 + 3 P
σ20
)
⇐⇒M3γ3 ≤ ζ3,
where in the compact notation,
γ3 :=

α1
α2
α3
 ∈ R3+, ζ3 :=

C{1}
C{2}
C{3}
C{1,2}
C{1,3}
C{2,3}
C{1,2,3}

,
M3 :=

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1

∈ Z7×3.
Note that M3 is a totally unimodular matrix. By letting P = 25, σ
2
0 = 0.1, we
show in Figure 2 the capacity region with three users.
We denote by
rm = log
(
1 +
P
σ20 + (m− 1)P
)
the rate of a user when the signal of the m − 1 other users is treated as noise,
and CJ = log(1+ |J | Pσ20 ) its capacity. Note that rm = C{m}−C{m−1}. The set C
is clearly a non-empty and bounded subset of Rm. C is closed and is defined by
Figure 2: Capacity region with three users.
2m−1 convex inequalities. Thus, C is convex and compact. From the inequality
log
1 +∑
j∈J
xj
 ≤ log
∏
j∈J
(1 + xj)
 = ∑
j∈J
log(1 + xj),
for all ∀x ∈ R|J|+ , we obtain CJ ≤
∑
j∈J C{j}.
2.3 Payoff
We define the payoff of user j as
uj(αj , α−j) =
 g(α
j) if (αj , α−j) ∈ C
0 otherwise
,
where αj is the rate of the user j; the vector α−j := (α1, . . . , αj−1, αj+1, . . . , αm)
is a profile of rates of the other users; the function g : R→ R is a positive and
strictly increasing function. Given the strategy profile α−j of the others players,
player j has to maximize uj(αj , α−j) under its action constraints
A(α−j) := {αj ∈ [0, C{j}], (αj , α−j) ∈ C}.
Using the monotonicity of the function g and the inequalities that define the
capacity region, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let BR(α−j) be the best reply to the strategy α−j is
BR(α−j) = arg max
y∈A(α−j)
uj(y, α−j).
BR is a non-empty single-valued correspondence (i.e., a standard function)
which is given by
max
rm,min
J
 CJ −
∑
k∈J
k 6=j
αk, J ∈ Γj


where Γj := {J ∈ 2Ω, J 3 j}.
Proposition 2.3.2. The set of Nash equilibria is
{(αj , α−j) | αj ≥ rm,
∑
j
αj = CΩ}.
All these equilibria are optimal in the Pareto sense.3
Proof. Let β ∈ C. If
m∑
j=1
βj < CΩ = log(1 +m
P
σ20
) ,
then at least one of the users can improve its rate (hence its payoff) to reach
one of the faces of the capacity region. We now check the strategy profile in the
3An allocation of payoffs is Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible
allocation that makes every user at least as well off and at least one user strictly better off
under the capacity constraint.
face
{(αj , α−j) | αj ≥ rm,
m∑
j=1
αj = CΩ}.
If
β ∈ {(αj , α−j) | αj ≥ rm,
m∑
j=1
αj = CΩ},
then from the Lemma, BR(β−j) = {βj}. Hence, β is a strict equilibrium. More-
over, this strategy β is Pareto optimal because the rate of each user is maximized
under the capacity constraint. These strategies are social welfare if the quantity
m∑
j=1
uj(αj , α−j) =
m∑
j=1
g(αj)
is maximized.
Note that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a convex subset of the capacity
region.
3 Robust equilibria and efficiency measures
3.1 Constrained Strong Equilibria and Coalition Proof-
ness
An action profile in a local interaction between m senders is a constrained
k−strong equilibrium if it is feasible and no coalition of size k can improve
the rate transmissions of each of its members with respect to the capacity con-
straints. An action is a constrained strong equilibrium [4] if it is a constrained
k−strong equilibrium for any size k. A strong equilibrium is then a policy from
which no coalition (of any size) can deviate and improve the transmission rate of
every member of the coalition (group of the simultaneous moves), while possibly
lowering the transmission rate of users outside the coalition group. This notion
of constrained strong equilibria 4 is very attractive because it is resilient against
coalitions of users. Most of the games do not admit any strong equilibrium
but in our case we will show that the multiple access channel game has several
strong equilibria.
Theorem 3.1.1. Any rate profile on the maximal face of the capacity region
C :
Facemax(C) := {(αj , α−j) ∈ Rm | αj ≥ rm,
m∑
j=1
αj = CΩ},
is a constrained strong equilibrium.
Proof. We remark that if the rate profile α is not on the maximal face of the
capacity region, then α is not resilient to deviation by a single user. Hence, α
cannot be a constrained strong equilibrium. This says that a necessary condition
for a rate profile to be a strong equilibrium is to be in the subset Facemax(C). We
now prove that the condition: α ∈ Facemax(C) is sufficient. Let α ∈ Facemax(C).
Suppose that k users deviate simultaneously from the rate profile α. Denote by
Dev the set of users which deviate simultaneously (eventually by forming a
coalition). The rate constraints of the deviants are
1. α′j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Dev,
2.
∑
j∈J¯ α
′j ≤ CJ¯ , ∀J¯ ⊆ Dev,
3.
∑
j∈J∩Dev α
′j ≤ CJ −
∑
j∈J,j /∈Dev α
j , ∀J ⊆ Ω, J ∩Dev 6= ∅.
In particular, for J = Ω, we have
∑
j∈Dev α
′j ≤ CΩ−
∑
j /∈Dev α
j . The total rate
of the deviants is bounded by CΩ −
∑
j /∈Dev α
j , which is not controlled by the
4Note that the set of constrained strong equilibria is a subset of Nash equilibria (by taking
coalitions of size one) and any constrained strong equilibrium is Pareto optimal (by taking
coalition of full size).
deviants. The deviants move to (α′j)j∈Dev with
∑
j∈Dev
α′j < CΩ −
∑
j /∈Dev
αj .
Then, there exists j such that αj > α′j . Since g is non-decreasing, this implies
that g(αj) > g(α′j). The user j who is a member of the coalition Dev does not
improve its payoff. If the rates of some of the deviants are increased, then the
rates of some other users from coalition must decrease. If (α′j)j∈Dev satisfies
∑
j∈Dev
α′j = CΩ −
∑
j /∈Dev
αj ,
then some users in the coalition Dev have increased their rates compared with
(αj)j∈Dev and some others in Dev have decreased their rates of transmission
(because the total rate is the constant CΩ−
∑
j /∈Dev α
j). The users in Dev with
a lower rate α′j ≤ αj do not benefit to be member of the coalition (Shapley
criterion of membership of coalition does not hold) . And this holds for any
∅ $ Dev j Ω. This completes the proof.
Corollary 3.1.2. In the constrained rate allocation game, Nash equilibria and
strong equilibria in pure strategies coincide.
3.2 Constrained Potential Function for Local Interaction
Introduce the following function:
V (α) =C (α)
m∑
j=1
g(αj) ,
where C is the indicator function of C, i.e., C (α) = 1 if α ∈ C and 0 otherwise.
The function V satisfies
V (α)− V (βj , α−j) = g(αj)− g(βj), ∀α, (β,α−j) ∈ C.
If g is differentiable, then one has
∂
∂αj
V (α) = g′(αj) =
∂
∂αj
uj
in the interior of the capacity region C, and V is a constrained potential function
[22] in pure strategies.
Corollary 3.2.1. The local maximizers of V in C are pure Nash equilibria.
Global maximizers of V in C are both constrained strong equilibria and social
optima for the local interaction.
3.3 Strong Price of Anarchy
Throughout this subsection, we assume that the function g is the identity func-
tion, i.e., g(x) = id(x) := x. One of the approaches used to measure how much
the performance of decentralized systems is affected by the selfish behavior of
its components is the price of anarchy. We present a similar price for strong
equilibria under the coupled rate constraints. This notion of Price of Anar-
chy can be seen as an efficiency metric that measures the price of selfishness
or decentralization and has been extensively used in the context of congestion
games or routing games where typically users have to minimize a cost function.
In the context of rate allocation in the multiple access channel, we define an
equivalent measure of price of anarchy for rate maximization problems. One of
the advantages of a strong equilibrium is that it has the potential to reduce the
distance between the optimal solution and the solution obtained as an outcome
of selfish behavior, typically in the case where the capacity constraint is violated
at each time. Since the constrained rate allocation game has strong equilibria,
we can define the strong price of anarchy, introduced in [2], as the ratio between
the payoff of the worst constrained strong equilibrium and the social optimum
value which CΩ.
Theorem 3.3.1. The strong price of anarchy of the constrained rate allocation
game is 1 for g(x) = x.
Note that for g 6= id, the CSPoA can be less than one. However, the op-
timistic price of anarchy of the best constrained equilibrium also called price of
stability [3] is one for any function g i.e the efficiency of ”best” equilibria is
100%.
4 Selection of Pure Equilibria
We have shown in previous sections that our rate allocation game has a contin-
uum of pure Nash equilibria and strong equilibria. We address now the problem
of selecting one equilibrium which has certain desirable properties: the normal-
ized pure Nash equilibrium, introduced in [13]. See also [15, 6, 9]. We introduce
the Lagrangian that corresponds to the constrained maximization problem faced
by every user when the other rates are at the maximal face of the polytope C:
max
α
uj(α) (2)
s.t. α1 + . . .+ αm = CΩ (3)
and the Lagrangian for user j is given by
Lj(α, ζ) = uj(α)− ζj
∑
j
αj − CΩ
 .
From Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, it follows that there exists
ζ ∈ Rm such that
g′(αj) = ζj ,
m∑
j=1
αj = CΩ.
For a fixed vector ζ with identical entries, define the normal form game Γ(ζ)
with m users, where actions are taken as rates and the payoffs given by L(α, ζ).
A normalized equilibrium is an equilibrium of the game Γ(ζ∗) where ζ∗ is nor-
malized into the form ζ∗j = cτj , c > 0, τ
j > 0. We now have the following result
due to Goodman [6] which implies Rosen’s condition on uniqueness for strict
concave games.
Theorem 4.0.2. Let uj be a smooth and strictly concave function in αj , each
uj be convex in α−j, and there exist some ζ such that the weighted non-negative
sum of the payoffs
∑m
j=1 ζ
juj(α) is concave in α. Then the matrix
G(α, ζ) +GT (α, ζ)
is negative definite (which implies uniqueness) where G(α, ζ) is the Jacobian
with respect to α of
h(α, ζ) :=
[
ζ1∇1u1(α), ζ2∇2u2(α), . . . , ζm∇mum(α)
]T
and GT is the transpose of the matrix G.
This now leads to the following corollary for our problem.
Corollary 4.0.3. If g is a non-decreasing strictly concave function, then the
rate allocation game has a unique normalized equilibrium which corresponds to
an equilibrium of the normal form game with payoff L(α, ζ∗) for some ζ∗.
5 Stability and Dynamics
In this section, we study the stability of equilibria and several classes of evo-
lutionary game dynamics. We show that the evolutionary game has a unique
pure constrained evolutionary stable strategy.
Proposition 5.1. The collection of rates
α =
(
CΩ
m
, . . . ,
CΩ
m
)
,
i.e the distribution of Dirac concentrated on the rate CΩm , is the unique symmetric
pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the constrained rate allocation game is symmetric, there exists
a symmetric (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium. If such an equilibrium exists
in pure strategies, each user transmits with the same rate r∗. It follows from
Proposition 2.3.2, and the bound rm ≤ CΩm that r∗ satisfies mr∗ = CΩ and r∗
is feasible.
Since the set of feasible actions is convex, we can define convex combination
of rates in the set of the feasible rates. For example, α′ + (1− )α is a feasible
rate if α′ and α are feasible. The symmetric rate profile (r, r, . . . , r) is feasible
if and only if 0 ≤ r ≤ r∗ = CΩm . We say that the rate r is a constrained
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if it is feasible and for every mutant strategy
mut 6= α there exists mut > 0 such that r :=  mut+ (1− )r ∈ C ∀ ∈ (0, mut)u(r, r, . . . , r) > u(mut, r, . . . , r) ∀ ∈ (0, mut)
Theorem 5.1.1. The pure strategy r∗ = CΩm is a constrained evolutionary stable
strategy.
Proof. Let mut ≤ r∗ The rate  mut+(1−)r∗ is feasible implies that mut ≤ r∗
(because r∗ is the maximum symmetric rate achievable). Since mut 6= r∗, mut
is strictly lower than r∗. By monotonicity of the function g, one has
u(r∗,  mut+ (1− )r∗) > u(mut,  mut+ (1− )r∗), ∀.
This completes the proof.
5.2 Symmetric Mixed Strategies
Define the mixed capacity regionM(C) as the set of measures profile (µ1, µ2, . . . , µm)
such that ∫
R|J|+
∑
j∈J
αj
∏
j∈J
µj(dαj) ≤ CJ , ∀J ⊆ 2Ω.
Then the payoff of the action a ∈ R+ satisfying (a, λ, . . . , λ) ∈ M(C) can be
defined as
F (a, µ) =
∫
[0,∞[m−1
u(a, b2, . . . , bm) νm−1(db) ,
where νk =
⊗k
1 µ is the product measure on [0,∞[k. The constraint set becomes
the set of probability measures on R+ such that
0 ≤ E(µ) :=
∫
R+
αj µ(dαj) ≤ CΩ
m
< C{1} .
Lemma 5.2.1. F (a, µ) =[0,CΩ−(m−1)E(µ)] ×g(a)×
∫
b∈Da
νm−1(db) =[0,CΩ−(m−1)E(µ)] ×g(a)νm−1(Da)
where
Da = {(b2, . . . , bm) | (a, b2, . . . , bm) ∈ C} .
Proof. If the rate does not satisfy the capacity constraints, then the payoff is 0.
Hence the rational rate for user j is lower than C{j}. Fix a rate a ∈ [0, C{j}].
Let DaJ := CJ − aδ{1∈J}. Then, a necessary condition to have a non-zero payoff
is
(b2, . . . , bm) ∈ Da ,
where
Da = {(b2, . . . , bm) ∈ Rm−1+ ,
∑
j∈J,j 6=1
bj ≤ DaJ , J ⊆ 2Ω}.
Thus,
F (a, µ) =
∫
Rm−1+
u(a, b2, . . . , bm) νm−1(db)
=
∫
b∈Rm−1+ , (a,b)∈C
g(a) νm−1(db)
= [0,CΩ−(m−1)E(µ)] g(a)
×
∫
b∈Da
νm−1(db)
5.3 Constrained Evolutionary Game Dynamics
The class of evolutionary games in large population provides a simple frame-
work for describing strategic interactions among large numbers of users. In this
subsection we turn to modeling the behavior of the users who play them. Tra-
ditionally, predictions of behavior in game theory are based on some notion of
equilibrium, typically Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium, Nash equi-
librium, Stackelberg solution, Wardrop equilibrium or some refinement thereof.
These notions require the assumption of equilibrium knowledge, which posits
that each user correctly anticipates how his opponents will act. The equilibrium
knowledge assumption is too strong and is difficult to justify in particular in con-
texts with large numbers of users. As an alternative to the equilibrium approach,
we propose an explicitly dynamic updating choice, a procedure in which users
myopically update their behavior in response to their current strategic environ-
ment. This dynamic procedure does not assume the automatic coordination of
users’ actions and beliefs, and it can derive many specifications of users’ choice
procedures. These procedures are specified formally by defining a revision of
rates called revision protocol [14]. A revision protocol takes current payoffs and
current mean rate and maps to conditional switch rates which describe how fre-
quently users in some class playing rate α who are considering switching rates
switch to strategy α′. Revision protocols are flexible enough to incorporate a
wide variety of paradigms, including ones based on imitation, adaptation, learn-
ing, optimization, etc.
We use a class of continuous evolutionary dynamics. We refer to [17, 19, 18]
for evolutionary game dynamics with or without time delays. The continuous-
time evolutionary game dynamics on the measure space (A,B(A), µ) is given
by
λ˙t(E) =
∫
a∈E
V (a, λt)µ(da) (4)
where
V (a, λt) = K
[∫
x∈A
βxa (λt)λt(dx)−
∫
x∈A
βax(λt)λt(dx)
]
,
and βxa represents the rate of mutation from x to a, and K is a growth parameter.
βxa (λt) = 0 if (x, λt) or (a, λt) is not in the (mixed) capacity region, E is a
µ−measurable subset of A. At each time t, probability measure λt satisfies
d
dtλt(A) = 0.
Constrained Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.
The constrained revision protocol is
βxa (λt) =

max(F (a, λt)−
∫
x
F (x, λt) dx, 0)
if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈M(C)
0 otherwise
Constrained Replicator Dynamics.
βxa (λt) =

max(F (a, λt)− F (x, λt), 0)
if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈M(C)
0 otherwise
Constrained θ−Smith Dynamics.
βxa (λt) =

max(F (a, λt)− F (x, λt), 0)θ
if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈M(C)
0 otherwise
, θ ≥ 1
We now provide a common property that applies to all these dynamics: the
set of Nash equilibria is a subset of rest points (stationary points) of the evolu-
tionary game dynamics. Here we extend to evolutionary game with a continuous
action space and coupled constraints, and more than two-users interactions. The
counterparts of these results in discrete action space can be found in [7, 14].
Theorem 5.3.1. Any Nash equilibrium of the game is a rest point of the fol-
lowing evolutionary game dynamics: constrained Brown-von Neumann-Nash,
generalized Smith dynamics, and replicator dynamics. In particular, the evo-
lutionary stable strategies set is a subset of the rest points of these constrained
evolutionary game dynamics.
Proof. It is clear for pure equilibria by using the revision protocols β of these
dynamics. Let λ be an equilibrium. For any rate a in the support of λ, βax = 0
if F (x, λ) ≤ F (a, λ). Thus, if λ is an equilibrium the difference between the
microscopic inflow and outflow is V (a, λ) = 0, given that a is the support of the
measure λ.
Let λ be a finite Borel measure on [0, C{j}] with full support. Suppose g is
continuous on [0, C{j}]. Then, λ is a rest point of the BNN dynamics if and only
if λ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Note that the choice of topology is an
important issue when defining dynamics convergence and stability. The most
used in this area is the topology of the weak convergence to measure closeness
of two states of the system. Different distances (Prohorov metric, metric on
bounded and Lipschitz continuous functions onA) have been proposed. We refer
the reader to [11], and the references therein for more details on evolutionary
robust strategy and stability notions.
6 Generalization
In this section, we consider the asymmetric case. Each user has its maximum
power Pi and a channel gain hi. In addition, the rate of transmission is subject
to a coupled capacity constraint. The capacity region C is described by the set
{
α ∈ Rm+ ,
∑
i∈Ω
αi ≤ CΩ, ∀ ∅ ⊂ Ω ⊆ N
}
, (5)
where Ω is any subset of N and
CΩ = log
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ω
Pihi
σ20
)
, (6)
is the capacity for users in Ω. The capacity region reveals a competitive na-
ture of the interactions among senders: if a user i wants to communicate at a
higher rate, one of the other users has to lower his rate; otherwise, the capacity
constraint is violated. We let
ri,Ω := log
(
1 +
Pihi
σ20 +
∑
i′∈Ω,i′ 6=i Pi′hi′
)
denote the bound rate of a user when the signals of the |Ω| − 1 other users are
treated as noise.
Due to the noncooperative nature of the rate allocation, we can formulate
the one-shot game
Ξ = 〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 ,
where the set of users N is the set of players, Ai, i ∈ N , is the set of actions, and
ui, i ∈ N , are the payoff functions. We define ui : ∏mi=1Ai → R+ as follows.
ui(αi, α−i) = C (α)gi(αi, α−i) (7)
=
 g
i(αi) if (αi, α−i) ∈ C
0 otherwise
, (8)
where C is the indicator function; α−i is a vector consisting of other players’
rates, i.e., α−i = [α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN ] and ui is a positive and strictly
increasing function for each fixed α−i. Since the game is subject to coupled
constraints, the action set Ai is coupled and dependent on other players’ actions.
Given the strategy profile α−i of other players, the constrained action set Ai is
given by
Ai(α−i) := {αi ∈ [0, C{i}], (αi, α−i) ∈ C} (9)
We then have an asymmetric game. The minimum rate that the user i can
guarantee in the feasible regions is ri,N which is different than rj,N .
Each user i maximizes ui(αi, α−i) over the coupled constraint set. Owing to
the monotonicity of the function gi and the inequalities that define the capacity
region, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6.0.2. Let BR
i
(α−i) be the best reply to the strategy α−i, defined by
BR
i
(α−i) = arg max
y∈Ai(α−i)
ui(y, α−i).
BR
i
is a non-empty single-valued correspondence (i.e a standard function), and
is given by
max
ri,N , min
Ω∈Γi
CΩ − ∑
k∈Ω\{i}
αk

 , (10)
where Γi = {Ω ∈ 2N , i ∈ Ω}.
Proposition 6.1. The set of Nash equilibria is
{(αi, α−i) | αi ≥ ri,N ,
∑
i∈N
αi = CN }.
All these equilibria are optimal in Pareto sense.
Proof. Let β be a feasible solution, i.e., β ∈ C. If
N∑
i=1
βi < CN = log
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
Pihi
σ20
)
,
then at least one of the users can improve its rate (hence its payoff) to reach
one of the faces of the capacity region. We now check the strategy profile on
the face {
(αi, α−i)
∣∣∣∣ αi ≥ ri,N , N∑
i=1
αi = CN
}
.
If
β ∈
{
(αi, α−i)
∣∣∣∣ αi ≥ ri,N , N∑
i=1
αi = CΩ
}
,
then from the Lemma 6.0.2, BR
i
(β−i) = {βi}. Hence, β is a strict equilibrium.
Moreover, this strategy β is Pareto optimal because the rate of each user is
maximized under the capacity constraint. These strategies are social welfare
optimal if the total utility
N∑
i=1
ui(αi, α−i) =
N∑
i=1
gi(αi)
is maximized subject to constraints.
Note that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a convex subset of the capacity
region. The pure equilibria are global optima5 if the function g is the identity
function.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied an evolutionary Multiple Access Channel game
with a continuum action space and coupled rate constraints. We showed that the
game has a continuum of strong equilibria which are 100% efficient in the rate
optimization problem. We proposed the constrained Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics, Smith dynamics, and the replicator dynamics to study the stability
of equilibria in the long run. An interesting question which we leave for future
work is whether similar equilibria structure exist in the case of multiple access
games with non-convex capacity regions. Another extension would be to the
hybrid model in which users can select among several receivers and control the
total rate, which is currently under study.
5This implies that the price of anarchy is one.
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